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Bad Science Makes Bad Law:
How the Deference Afforded to Psychiatry
Undermines Civil Liberties
Samantha Godwin
ABSTRACT
Courts and lawmakers trust psychiatric expertise when making judicial
and public policy decisions concerning mental health, but is this trust well
placed? This paper adopts a philosophy of science approach informed by
medical research to evaluate the validity of psychiatric classification. This
approach provides the basis for an interdisciplinary critical analysis of civil
commitment law and use of psychiatric expert witnesses in light of legal
evidence standards. This analysis demonstrates that involuntary civil
commitment as it now stands is incompatible with broader due process and
civil rights concerns and affords an unjustifiable evidentiary status to
psychiatric diagnosis.

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers psychiatric diagnoses, the psychiatric profession,
and the roles they play in the legal system. Judges and juries rely on
psychiatric expert testimony to provide factual information when cases deal
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with mental health. 1 Legislators draft civil commitment statutes with the
understanding that mental illness is a material phenomenon that actually
exists in the world and not only in the beliefs of psychiatrists and the public.
In the first part of this article, I challenge the assumption that psychiatry
provides reliable and scientific facts by demonstrating that the evidence
available to psychiatrists is typically insufficient to support many of the
claims they make about mental illness. In summary, psychiatry lacks
reliability as a science because psychiatry’s methodological approach to its
own diagnostic criteria is not empirically meaningful; it categorizes mental
illness in an arbitrary rather than scientifically valid way; and its theories
are frequently unfalsifiable.
Having built a theoretical case against the scientific reliability of
psychiatric diagnoses, in the second part of this paper, I critique courts’
reliance on psychiatrists and psychiatry in establishing the facts of cases
dealing with mental health. First, I demonstrate the jurisprudential
inconsistency of granting psychiatric expert witnesses and diagnoses
evidentiary status. Second, I critically evaluate the legal and philosophical
bases for the involuntary civil commitment system through a close analysis
of key case history in light of the problems with psychiatric evidence. In
conclusion, I argue for radical reforms in mental health law that preserve
constitutional guarantees of due process, rather than allow courts to be
wowed by the pseudoscience of psychiatry.

II. PART ONE: PSYCHIATRY IS INSUFFICIENTLY SCIENTIFIC
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained
by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that
of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. . . . [I]n psychology,
there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. . . . The
existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the
1

For an example of the role of psychiatric expert testimony in civil commitment
proceedings, see Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Modern Status as to Standard of Proof
Required in Civil Commitment, 97 A.L.R.3d 780 (1980).
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means of solving the problems which trouble us; though the
problem and method pass one another by.2
In any science, one of the fundamental questions of method is how
scientists arrive at their theoretical conclusions from the observable data
they have to work with. Such questions might include whether the
conclusions are logically inferred from the data, whether the veracity of the
theory depends only on the accuracy of the data, or whether the alternative
hypotheses fit the data with equal logical plausibility.
When considering these questions as they apply to psychotherapy, it is
necessary to consider the scope of the claims being made and the scope of
the data being used. The data psychiatrists work with is very limited.
Authoritative research has not conclusively demonstrated any specific
biological causes for mental disorders. Furthermore, there are no biological
markers for mental disorders, nor are there any laboratory tests to diagnoses
mental illness.3 Psychotherapeutic treatments, such as psychoanalysis and

2

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 232 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., Blackwell Publishers 2d ed. 1997).
3
See U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-538, THE BIOLOGY OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 13–14 (1992), available at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9237.pdf
[hereinafter OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT] “Many questions remain about the biology of
mental disorders. In fact, research has yet to identify specific biological causes for any of
these disorders.” Id. at 13–14. “Mental disorders are classified on the basis of symptoms
because there are as yet no biological markers or laboratory tests for them. Such
groupings, therefore, may not be completely valid—similar symptoms may result from a
variety of causes.” Id. at 46–47. Psychiatrist Allen Frances, chair of the APA DSM-IV
Task Force and Professor Emeritus at Duke University, describes the issue as follows:
Simply stated, descriptive psychiatric diagnosis does not now need and cannot
support a paradigm shift. There can be no dramatic improvements in
psychiatric diagnosis until we make a fundamental leap in our understanding
of what causes mental disorders. The incredible recent advances in
neuroscience, molecular biology, and brain imaging that have taught us so
much about normal brain functioning are still not relevant to the clinical
practicalities of everyday psychiatric diagnosis. The clearest evidence
supporting this disappointing fact is that not even 1 biological test is ready for
inclusion in the criteria sets for DSM-V. Fortunately, the NIMH is now
embarked on a fascinating effort to effect the real paradigm shift of basing
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psychopharmacological drugs, often appear to provide relief from
disturbing psychological phenomena. However, the mechanism by which
psychotherapeutic treatments result in symptom relief cannot be
examined. That is, the relationship between the therapies and the
symptom’s underlying etiology is unobservable.4
The central issue is the extent to which the observable data of symptom
relief provide verification for theories concerning the unobservable causes
of those symptoms. To use an analogy, it is a little like the experience of
smacking the side of a television to fix a fuzzy picture: if you know how to
fix something, but you are not able to conclusively determine how you got
it to work, then knowing how to fix it provides only a limited insight into
why it broke.
There is an epistemological dilemma posed by the gap between the
subject matter investigated by psychotherapists and observable
psychological phenomena. Clinical psychologists and psychiatrists have
developed elaborate theories to explain the behavior of individual patients
and categories of patients, but their principal method of testing those
theories experimentally is by way of psychiatrists’ and psychotherapists’

diagnosis on biological findings. Unfortunately, this is years (if not decades)
from fruition.
Allen Frances, A Warning Sign on the Road to DSM-V: Beware of its Unintended
Consequences, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Aug. 2009, at 1, 4 (emphasis added). Professor
Frances went on to explain that psychiatric diagnosis is currently “stuck at [a] descriptive
level” without a “fundamental and explanatory understanding of causality.” Id.
4
E.g., ELLIOT S. VALENSTEIN, BLAMING THE BRAIN 96 (1996).
The explanations of how psychotherapeutic drugs help to alleviate mental
disorders rarely go beyond stating what chemical changes the drugs
induce. The psychiatric literature rarely address how or why an excess or
deficiency in serotonin or dopamine activity explains any particular
mental disorder. There are few serious attempts to bridge the huge gap
between neurochemistry and the psychological phenomena that must
ultimately be explained.
Id.
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abilities to alter the behavior or experience through treatment.5 Although it
is often claimed that the manner in which the symptoms respond to
treatment, whether through drugs or psychoanalysis, is heuristically
meaningful to the cause of the symptoms,6 this can only be plausible if one
accepts the initial premise that the treatment works in the way the
psychologist or psychiatrist believes it works.
The types of tests that clinical psychological hypotheses rely on are
methodologically circular because they require that data be interpreted
according to assumptions that hold true only if the hypothesis is, in fact,
correct.
Therefore, these hypotheses cannot be verified empirically, because the
probative value of the evidence offered in their support depends on the truth
of the hypotheses being tested. The scientific status of all hypotheses of this
sort is questionable regardless of the volume of data collected to support
them. While physicians confirmed to a very high degree of probability a
hypothesis that syphilis can cause dementia7 by confirming syphilis in blood
samples and charting its progression through physical observation,
psychiatrists do not employ similar methods. As will be discussed more
fully in Part One, specific “mental illnesses,” by contrast to known
neurological diseases, cannot be confirmed with similar scientifically
meaningful measurements. Although it is true that verification of medical
hypotheses can only be certain to an unknown degree of probability, data

5

For a discussion of experimental testing of theories with regard to depression, see e.g.,
Jeffrey R. Lacasse & Jonathan Leo, Serotonin and Depression: A Disconnect between the
Advertisement and the Scientific Literature, 2 PLOS MED. 1211, 1211–15 (2005);
Jonathan Leo & Jeffrey R. Lacasse, The Media and the Chemical Imbalance Theory of
Depression, SOC’Y, Nov. 2008, at 35–45.
6
See Lacasse & Leo, supra note 5, at 35.
7
This example was suggested by Heathcote Wales, Professor of Law at Georgetown
University Law Center, in comments made on an earlier draft of this paper. For a
description of dementia as a symptom of syphilis, see Neurosyphilis, PUBMED HEALTH,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001722/ (last reviewed Sept. 15,
2010).
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mobilized in support of psychiatric hypotheses cannot even achieve this.
Provided one controls for confounding variables, coincidence, and reverse
causation, the greater the percentage of dementia patients whose blood
samples test positive for syphilis compared to a control group, the more
likely syphilis is to be a possible cause of dementia. There is no equivalent
in psychiatry. No matter how large a sample of delusional patients one has,
this will never provide evidence that schizophrenia causes delusions
because the presence of schizophrenia cannot be confirmed except through
reference to the delusions and other symptoms themselves. For example,
there are no physically based diagnostic tests for schizophrenia, it is only
inferred from characteristics psychiatrists assume to be its symptoms.8 This
will be explored more thoroughly in Part One.
A. General Epistemological Problems for Theories of Mental Illness
1. Adolf Grünbaum’s Critique of Psychoanalytic Therapy
Adolf Grünbaum, a leading philosopher of science at the University of
Pittsburg who studied psychoanalysis’s epistemological liabilities, offered
one of the major critiques of psychoanalysis to come out of the analytic
philosophy of science. In this section, I expand upon his critique in order to
demonstrate how it could apply equally to psychiatry. In this way, I propose
that the epistemological liabilities of psychoanalysis are not unique to
psychoanalysis but are also found, in a form, in psychiatry, and therefore
psychiatry’s claims to scientific validity must also be treated with great
skepticism.
Grünbaum recognized a source of epistemological problems in
psychoanalysis: the psychoanalysts’ preferred means for verifying
psychoanalytic hypotheses are found within the discipline and the theory
8
Albana M. Dassori, Alexander L. Miller & Delia Saldana, Schizophrenia Among
Hispanics: Epidemiology, Phenomenology, Course, and Outcome, 21 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 303, 304 (1995) (“There was (and is) no test for schizophrenia that is independent
of the phenomenological criteria.”).
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itself. 9 Grünbaum wrote that “we have been told that the validation or
discreditation of psychoanalytic hypotheses is vouchsafed by the
investigatory value of the particular clinical techniques employed in the
psychoanalytic interview”10 and cites Paul Meehl, former president of the
American Psychological Association, as stating that “the best place to study
[i.e., test] psychoanalysis is the psychoanalytic session itself.”11 Attempts to
prove the validity of the psychoanalytic method by appeal to that method
itself assumes the reliability of the method that one is trying to evaluate.
This does not amount to a meaningful evaluation.
Freud tried to address this concern by offering what Grünbaum termed
the “Necessary Condition Thesis.”12 Grünbaum summarized the thesis as:
“Only psychoanalytic interpretations that ‘tally with what is real’ in the
patient can mediate veridical insight, and such insight, in turn, is causally
necessary for the successful alleviation of his neurosis.”13 This thesis can be
seen to suffer from the same circularity that is found in Meehl’s claim.
One of Grünbaum’s most effective refutations of the Necessary
Condition Thesis is that the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis could just
as plausibly be attributed to a placebo effect rather than showing any
relation between the psychoanalysis and what is real in the patient. 14
9
See Adolf Grünbaum, Epistemological Liabilities of the Clinical Appraisal of
Psychoanalytic Theory, 14 NOÛS 307, 375 (1980) [hereinafter Epistemological
Liabilities].
10
Id. at 310.
11
Id. at 375.
12
Id. at 321.
13
Id.
14
See generally id. Of course, psychoanalysts are not the only people who try to improve
the mental well being of others. Grünbaum drew a parallel with evangelical Christians
who use suggestion to produce profound personality changes in people who are “born
again” in their religious faith. See id. at 308. One might presume that evangelicals likely
use their own version of the “Necessary Condition Thesis,” believing that they could not
have had those transformative religious experiences except as a result of a “personal
relationship” with their God. See id. at 321. The positive transformation could therefore
seem to verify the “truth” of their religion, but only for people who accept that this is in
fact the mechanism responsible for the transformation. See id.
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Analytically, there is no clear way to know which of the explanations, true
insight or placebo, would be more correct.15 Even if we could imagine a
controlled experiment where the efficacy of a group of psychoanalysts was
compared to the efficacy of a group of untrained people attempting talk
therapy—if the psychoanalysts had superior results, this would not confirm
that the superior results were a result of true insight and not some other
difference in technique.16
While Grünbaum’s target was specifically psychoanalysis, his thesis is
indicative of a more general epistemological problem for theories informing
psychotherapy and the treatments, classifications, and etiologies of mental
disorders.
2. Could Theoretical Explanations for a Patient’s Mental State Be
Verified Externally?
It might be possible to consider a thought experiment to exclude placebo
effects. Imagine that a psychoanalyst offers a patient two sets of
explanations for the patient’s psychological issues: a first “control”
explanation that seems plausible but does not represent the genuine analysis
and a second “test” explanation informed by the actual analysis of the origin
of the patient’s condition. Even if the patient was to respond more
positively to the test explanation than to the control explanation, the
experiment would only provide evidence against a random placebo effect,
not evidence in favor of the psychoanalyst’s test explanation. The patient
may have reasons for wanting to believe the second explanation regardless
of whether it is accurate. For example, simply providing a plausible
narrative to frame a problem could provide relief. Or, a patient might find a
therapist’s explanation sympathetic, and the experience of sympathy could
have a therapeutic effect. Because we cannot observe what mechanism in
the patient’s mind provided relief, and there are many plausible
15
16

See generally id. (discussing the epistemological limitation of psychoanalysis).
See generally id.
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mechanisms, the external response cannot constitute positive evidence of
any one of them.17
We could also assume that some hypotheses to explain a particular
patient’s behavior might be ruled out by evidence external to the patient, so
that there might be at least, in theory, a way to show that some psychiatric
theories are more plausible than others. The ability to rule out some
explanations does not, in and of itself, justify believing explanations that
have yet to be ruled out. For example, consider a therapist who theorizes
that her patient’s phobia is caused by either event A or event B. If, in
reality, the patient did experience event A but not event B, then a theory
contingent on event B can be ruled out. This does not mean, however, that
the fact that event A occurred provides evidence that event A caused the
patient’s phobia. The only reason to believe that event A is the cause of
phobia is the theory itself, so it is circular to say that the fact of event A
supports the therapist’s theory. Whether event A is viewed as necessary,
contributory, or coincidental to phobia depends not on the presence or
absence of event A, but whether one considers event A as meaningful to
understanding the phobia. The fact that event A happened has only
evidentiary value to the hypothesis that event A caused the phobia if the fact
is interpreted with the assumption the hypothesis is true. So, while external
facts about a patient may be sufficient to determine that some hypotheses
are false, they are not sufficient to show that other hypotheses are likely
true.
If there was a large enough sample of patients with the same phobia, and
enough of them experienced event A, it might be possible to build a case
that event A could probably contribute to that type of phobia using an
experimental methodology to minimize confounding variables. This would
still, however, be insufficient to determine whether event A was a cause for
the phobia in any individual patient since individual patients’ particular
17

However, it might be possible to rule some out.
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phobias could have causes: statistically demonstrating that a certain variable
probably causes a certain effect (absent unknown confounding variables)
does not demonstrate that other variables would not also cause this effect in
any given case. It also could not confirm any theory of how event A is
responsible for phobias. More significantly for psychiatry, however,
attributing “mental illnesses” themselves as causes for patient symptoms
could not be similarly evidenced by observation or historical records for the
simple reason that “mental illnesses” are defined by the symptoms
themselves.18
The disease or organic model of psychiatric mental illness might
superficially appear to be more scientific than Freudian psychoanalytic
claims, since psychiatry more uniformly positions itself as a medical
discipline. However, this treatment model similarly posits theories of
mental disturbances on an evidentiary basis dependent on assumptions
contained within the hypothesis being tested: the treatment effects of
psychiatric interventions on patient behavior only contribute evidence to
support a proposed etiology if the relationship between cause and effect is
in fact as it is according to the etiological theory. This is not a safe inference
because the issue in question when diagnosing a patient is precisely what
the cause or causes of the complaint or aberrant behavior are. When trying
to determine a cause and effect relationship, an alleged effect only has
evidentiary status in suggesting the presence of its alleged cause if the
relationship between cause and effect accords with the theory. The
theoretical framework itself, as will be described in greater detail in the
following sections, lacks grounding in empirical observation, unlike other
fields in science and medicine. As a result, the symptoms do not, in and of
themselves, provide evidence to support the general etiological theory, so
hypotheses concerning the causes of mental disturbances in psychiatry

18

See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 46–47.
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suffer from similar problems of epistemological circularity as with
psychoanalysis.
3. Reliable Inferences About the Cause of a Mental State Cannot Be
Made by Altering the Mental State
Mental illnesses are popularly said to be caused by a “chemical
imbalance in the brain,” which can be corrected by psychoactive drugs.19
The fact that the psychoactive drugs (sometimes) relieve undesirable
symptoms is thought to provide evidence that these imbalances exist to be
corrected. 20 Both psychiatrists and laypersons frequently believe that if
someone appears to be suffering from some kind of malfunction of the brain
and raising the level of a certain chemical in the brain appears to improve its
function, this implies that the chemical levels raised were previously
deficient, even absent any laboratory tests to determine pre-treatment
deficiency.21 To illustrate why inferences from altering a mental state do not
help prove the cause of the original mental state, consider an example from
Grünbaum:
[P]henothiazenes [sic] turned out to be capable of inducing the
negative side effect of parkinsonism, at least transiently (cf.
Balkiston [8]: 1130). But the motor impairment manifested by
parkinsonians is attributed to a deficiency of brain dopamine.
Hence the unfavorable parkinsonian side effect of the
phenothiazene [sic] drugs on schizophrenics amid the alleviation of
psychotic symptoms produced by them turned out to have heuristic
value as follows: Besides suggesting that these drugs block the
dopamine receptors in the brain, it raised the possibility that an
19
The notion that chemical imbalances in the brain are the cause of mental illness is
called the “monoaime hypothesis” in the literature. See STEPHEN M. STAHL, STAHL’S
ESSENTIAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: NEUROSCIENTIFIC BASIS AND PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS 488–89, 521 (3d ed. 2008). There is no direct evidence of this, and
attempts at direct verification of varieties of chemical imbalances in depression have
failed and provided some evidence against the hypothesis in its basic form. See id.
20
See Lacasse & Leo, supra note 5, at 1212.
21
See id.

VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012

658 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

excess of dopamine might be implicated in, the aetiology of
schizophrenia. In this way, a biochemical malfunction of the brain
was envisioned quite specifically as causally relevant to this
psychosis (cf. Kolata [43a]). 22
Even if it is assumed that (1) parkinsonism has a single etiology rather
than being a symptom with multiple causes, (2) parkinsonism is always
caused by dopamine deficiency, and (3) phenothiazine reduces dopamine
production or activation, it still would not follow from these three
assumptions that there is a logical imperative for believing that
phenothiazine reduces psychosis by the same mechanism through which it
induces parkinsonism.
Anti-psychotic drugs are known to have diverse side effect profiles.23 In
fact, different anti-psychotic drugs prescribed to treat the same symptoms
often result in different side effects.24 Since these drugs often have more
than one neurological effect,25 the reduction in psychotic symptoms could
be attributable to an entirely different neurological mechanism besides
dopamine reduction. If phenothiazines exhibit at least two mechanisms, one
of which causes a reduction in psychotic symptoms and the other of which
induces parkinsonism, then even correctly identifying the cause of the
parkinsonism would not shed light on the cause of the reduced psychosis,
let alone the cause of the original psychosis. Putting all of those problems
aside and, for the sake of evaluating the logic of the claim, adopting the
additional assumption that it is in fact a reduction in the effect of dopamine
that leads to relief from psychotic symptoms in schizophrenic patients
22

Grünbaum, supra note 9, at 328.
See ROBERT J. WALDINGER, PSYCHIATRY FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS 529 (3d ed. 1997)
(arguing that “[a]ll antipsychotics have side effects” and exhibiting a list of side effects).
See also L. Voruganti et al., Comparative Evaluation of Conventional and Novel
Antipsychotic Drugs with Reference to their Subjective Tolerability, Side-Effect Profile
and Impact on Quality of Life, 43 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 135–45 (2000) (comparing and
discussing side effects).
24
See Voruganti, supra note 23.
25
See id.
23
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treated with phenothiazine, this still would not provide compelling evidence
for asserting that schizophrenia is caused by a malfunction of the brain
leading to excess dopamine. To assert such a claim would require
knowledge of the specifics of the state of a schizophrenic’s brain prior to
phenothiazine treatment. This is because the treatment only loosely suggests
information about the brain in an altered post-phenothiazine administration
state, and it is the prior state that is the subject of the theory.
Attempting to infer causation from correlation produces “third variable
problems” throughout medicine and science. 26 In other scientific fields,
there are strategies to increase the probability of a causal relation, such as
randomizing “controlled” variables to prevent a systematic relation between
the controlled variable and the independent variable being tested. 27
Psychiatric causal theories, however, would resist these approaches for a
simple reason: it is only possible to reliably control for third variables when
the variables are known.28 When it comes to the question of how mental
states are formed, the variables are largely unknown.29 Not only do we not
know all of the factors that might affect a person’s mind, we cannot
determine the range of variables that might influence it. Typically, when

26

See JOHN PHILLIPS, HOW TO THINK ABOUT STATISTICS 59–60 (1973). For a longer
explanation of correlation and causation, see DAVID MOORE, STATISTICS CONCEPTS AND
CONTROVERSIES 208–20 (1985).
27
See PHILLIPS, supra note 26, at 141.
28
There are, however, attempts to control for unknown variables through randomization.
See generally Mark Nickerson, The Control of Unknown Variables, 97 CAN. MED.
ASSOC. J. 118–22 (1967) (discussing attempts to control for unknown variables in
clinical pharmacology. However, questions can remain as to how random the sample
actually is, or whether symmetrical relationships with unknown variables persist, as long
as those variables are themselves unknown).
29
See John Horgan, The Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Defies Replication,
Medication, and Explanation, 10 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 470, 473 (1999); Howard
Gardner, Scientific Psychology: Should We Bury it or Praise it?, 10 NEW IDEAS IN
PSYCHOL. 179, 180 (1992); Peter Munz, The Phenomenon of Consciousness from a
Popperian Perspective, in CONSCIOUSNESS TRANSITIONS: PHYLOGENETIC,
ONTOGENETIC AND PHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS 307–26 (Hans Liljenström & Peter Århem
eds., 2008).
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associations between two variables reoccur in various circumstances
(reducing the chance that the correlation is due to a confounding variable), a
plausible theory explains how one variable causes the other and, if no
equally plausible confounding variable could explain the correlation, it is
reasonable to think that a causal relationship exists. 30 However, the
existence of an organic mental illness cannot be directly observed in order
to correlate it with any other variable;31 rather, it is said to be implied by the
symptoms themselves.32 Given this, we cannot establish correlation between
an organic disorder that exists apart from its symptoms and the symptoms
themselves, except with regard to disorders that can be verified through
non-psychiatric medical means.33
There are some basic flaws in trying to make inferences about the cause
of an original state of mind from how that mind apparently changed after
the introduction of a foreign substance such as a drug. To illustrate this,
consider an analogous psychological thought experiment. If a patient
presents with a mild case of “social phobia,” and a psychiatrist attempts to
“treat” the case by administering a dose of alcohol to the “patient,” they
would both likely find that relief from the symptoms would follow. 34 In
reality, the psychiatrist would probably not infer that the social phobia is
caused by a biochemical malfunction of the brain resulting in a sub-normal
blood alcohol level. However if the psychiatrist were to make such an
inference, that inference would be structurally the same as the example with
phenothiazine, dopamine, and schizophrenics. The ability to alter a state by
30

See MOORE, supra note 26, at 219.
See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 46–47.
32
See id.
33
See id. The epistemic difficulties with psychiatric methodology may not apply to the
methods of neurologists, but so far no definitive neurological markers have been found
for any mental illnesses. If diagnostic laboratory tests were possible, however, these
would not seem to constitute psychiatric tests but neurological tests, and this paper’s
subject is not the concept of mental illness but rather psychiatric expertise. See id.
34
Of course, some “patients” would not react this way—just as psychotropic medication
typically produces a variety of patient responses.
31
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introducing specific chemicals does not logically suggest that that those
chemicals are informative about the nature of the original condition any
more than a psychoanalyst’s ability to alter a patient’s emotional state by
describing what he believes to be the patient’s unconscious motives is
informative about what the genuine source of the patient’s original
emotional state was.
Moreover, because multiple mutually exclusive theories35 on the etiology
of schizophrenia would be consistent with the fact that phenothiazine
reduces psychosis in schizophrenics, the data cannot be said to scientifically
verify any theory. Instead, psychiatrists can at best make a speculative case
as to why phenothiazine might have such an effect. But given that any such
case cannot be structured into a testable hypothesis, it cannot be construed
meaningfully as scientific.
The use of phenothiazines to treat schizophrenia offers a strong example
of where the psychiatric profession was able to treat a condition with a drug
in a way that seemed to confirm that they “got it right.” Other
pharmaceutical interventions cast a less favorable light on psychiatry. To
use a prime example, anti-depressants work only marginally better than
placebos.36 Anti-depressants appear to work, but only because people tend
to improve from depression whether they take real medication or sugar
pills. 37 The marginal benefits may be attributed to a stronger placebo
mechanism than that experienced by control groups. People who develop

35

See generally A. Furnham & P. Bower, A Comparison of Academic and Lay Theories
of Schizophrenia, 161 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 201–10 (1992) (discussing the numerous
theories of schizophrenia’s etiology).
36
See Irving Kirsch & Guy Sapirstein, Listening to Prozac but Hearing Placebo: A
Meta-Analysis of Antidepressant Medication, PREVENTION & TREATMENT, June 1998, at
2a.
37
See id; Joanna Moncrieff, The Antidepressant Debate, 180 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY
193–94 (2002); Sharon Begley, The Depressing News About Antidepressants, THE DAILY
BEAST (Jan. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/28/the-depressing-news-aboutantidepressants.html.
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side effects tend to experience stronger placebo effects because the side
effects confirm that they received the real drug rather than the placebo,
causing an enhanced super-placebo effect.38
B. Are Psychiatric Diagnoses Equivalent to Medical Diagnoses?
Many would argue that even if psychiatry is not able to fully explain
scientifically the etiologies of mental disorders, it remains scientifically
valuable because it can identify coherent syndromes, describe diagnostic
criteria for those syndromes, and make predictions about individuals’
prognoses and responses to treatment by studying the population
experiencing these symptoms. This section challenges the widely-held
belief that psychiatric diagnoses correspond to any scientifically
ascertainable syndromes. While each new edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM) has increasingly shied away from describing
most disorders explicitly in terms of hypothesized etiology,39 psychiatrists
have continued to categorize clinical features according to unverifiable
theoretical classifications rather than classifying patients according to the
empirical data.
1. Could Psychiatric Diagnoses Have a Physical Reality?
Psychiatrists assert that particular symptoms are caused by, and are
evidence of, specific mental illnesses, which can be diagnosed by
evaluating a patient’s behavior and professed ideas. There is no doubt that
psychiatric patients can exhibit unusual behavior, or that they report
experiencing unusual thoughts, ideas, and sensations—and we might often
reasonably infer that there must be something “wrong” with them. The
question I wish to pose here is not whether diseases of the brain can occur
the same way as diseases of the body, but whether psychiatrists offer
scientifically testable reasons for thinking that the behavior and ideas
38
39

See Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 193 (using the term “amplified placebo effect”).
See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 46.
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patients present are truly symptomatic of the specific illnesses that
psychiatrists diagnose. The epistemological problem with psychiatric
diagnoses is that the specific mental illnesses tends to be defined not by any
scientifically testable underlying pathology or etiology, but by the
symptoms themselves.40 This amounts to a basically circular definition, and
a more detailed elaboration will be provided below. The question then
becomes whether the diagnostic criteria actually provide evidence for
specific mental illnesses or if the diagnostic criteria for mental illnesses are
essentially invented categories artificially imposed on the data. Patient
behavior, ideas, and experiences may be both real and organic in origin.
This may be true without any indication that the specific psychiatric
illnesses of which they are said to be symptoms have a somatic reality.
To use an example, patients can be diagnosed as schizophrenic if they
exhibit any two or more of a long list of varied and potentially unrelated
symptoms (provided that they do so with sufficient duration, have sufficient
social dysfunction, and do not meet certain exclusion criteria):
(1) delusions
(2) hallucinations
(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition
[Only one of the above] symptom[s] is required if delusions are
bizarre or hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running
commentary on the person’s behavior or thoughts, or two or more
voices conversing with each other.41
Imagine two groups: patients in group A have disorganized speech and an
affective flattening but normal perceptions and ideas, and patients in group
B have a bizarre delusion but typical speech and affect. Both A and B have
40

See id. at 47.
AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 312 (4th ed., text rev., 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
41
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social or occupational dysfunction and have had their symptoms for at least
one month. Additionally, nothing developmental, medical, or substancerelated explains the symptoms. According to the DSM classification, both A
and B should be said to suffer from schizophrenia. Yet A and B have no
symptoms in common and have totally different and seemingly unrelated
presentations. In what way does it make sense to say that both groups suffer
from the same mental illness?
This is not a case where patients with the same clinical presentation are
inferred to have the same syndrome due to their similarities. Instead, these
patients would be thought to have a common illness despite their complete
lack of similarities. The decision to classify A and B as suffering from the
same mental disorder could not be explained by the observable phenomena
of their clinical presentation but only by a theory about how those
symptoms relate to an underlying cause. As described in the previous
section, these theories cannot be empirically validated because the probative
value of their data depends on the veracity of their theoretical conclusions.
To extend this critique, imagine group C shares a belief that “a stranger
has removed [their] internal organs and has replaced them with someone
else’s organs without leaving any wounds or scars,”42 and, as a result of this
belief, all members of group C have quit their jobs. Group D also shares this
delusion, believing that a strangers have removed their internal organs and
replaced them with someone else’s. However, while members of group D
find this strange and disturbing, the delusion has not stopped them from
showing up to work or socializing with their friends (and thus they do not
meet Criteria B, an additional criteria, where to be diagnosed as
schizophrenic a patient must both have symptoms as described above and
substantial social dysfunction). Using the DSM IV-TR definition of
schizophrenia, group C suffers from the same mental disorder as groups A
and B—with whom it shares no common symptoms or experience—but
42

Id. at 299.
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group D is excluded from the same diagnostic category. This exclusion is
sanctioned despite the fact that C and D have precisely the same symptoms
and presentation, and they differ only in how well or how poorly they cope
with their afflictions (or, perhaps, differ only in random chance, in how well
they like their job and/or friends, or in how socially acceptable their
symptom is to people around them). At this point it becomes clear that the
description of schizophrenia as a label could not have emerged organically
merely from analyzing patient presentation and grouping a set of similarly
presenting patients together; rather, the way the psychiatric profession
groups patients together depends on the significance attributed to often
disparate symptoms.
In physical medicine, it is possible to suppose that two different
modalities of presentation might be attributable to the same underlying
condition, where some gold standard diagnostic test is positive in both
presentations.43 However, because no such physical test exists44 or, for that
matter, does any single unifying symptom or indicator demonstrate
schizophrenia,45 no such inference can be drawn. Instead, schizophrenia’s
diagnostic criteria seem to be an essentially arbitrary cluster of symptoms
that would characterize totally disparate clinical presentations under the
same label, while excluding from that label extremely similar
presentations.46 Another feature of the DSM definition of schizophrenia that
points to shoehorning symptoms into a preconceived invented category
rather than inferring a category from symptoms. Namely, that symptoms
vary according to demographics: schizophrenia supposedly occurs in one

43
Cf. M. Carrington Reid et al., Use of Methodological Standards in Diagnostic Test
Research, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 645, 646–49 (1995).
44
See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 41, at 299 (“No laboratory findings are
diagnostic of Schizophrenia . . . .”).
45
See id. at 305 (“No single symptom is pathognomonic of Schizophrenia . . . .”).
46
Cf. id. at 303 (discussing a wide range of “sub-types”); id. at 310–11 (discussing
distinctions made between schizophrenia and similar mental illnesses, some of which are
simply made “by definition”).
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pattern in men while presenting in a completely different pattern in women,
with differing symptoms beginning at different age ranges.47
Further, the supposed correlations between schizophrenia and the
tendency to have larger or smaller neuroanatomical structures than a control
group48 is of no help in establishing schizophrenia as a coherent, discrete
disorder that exists independently of the DSM-IV-TR. This is because the
sample of schizophrenia patients would have been selected according to the
DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria, and the correlations could have been made
stronger or weaker had a different diagnostic criteria set with a different
constellation of symptoms been adopted. This, therefore, provides no reason
to think that the set criteria actually used corresponds to any discrete
condition existing in the world.49
There is no reason to doubt that some people in reality fit the
presentations of A, B, and C. In this sense, “schizophrenia” might be “real”
in that there are people who would fit the description. But there is also no
reason to think that A, B, and C have anything naturally, medically, or
psychologically to do with each other, except insofar as the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) has arbitrarily decided to label them
together. Schizophrenia, like all so-called mental illnesses, has never had a
laboratory test, brain tissue abnormality, or other physical marker that can
47

See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 41, at 307–08.
See generally Martha E. Shenton et al., A Review of MRI Findings in Schizophrenia,
49 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1–52 (2001) (reviewing the literature of MRI findings).
49
The APA hints at acknowledging this limitation in the DSM-IV-TR:
48

The DSM-IV is a categorical classification that divides mental disorders
into types based on criteria sets with defining features. . . . [T]here is no
assumption that each category of mental disorder is a complete discrete
entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental disorders or
from no mental disorder. . . . The clinician using DSM-IV should
therefore consider that individuals sharing a diagnosis are likely to be
heterogeneous even in regard to the defining features of the diagnosis and
that boundary cases will be difficult to diagnose in any but a probabilistic
fashion.
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 41, at xxxi.
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identify it50 because it cannot be tested for or examined, and there is no way
to confirm that the symptoms are symptomatic of a specific, discrete,
underlying disorder. In this sense, no reason exists to believe that
schizophrenia as a discrete and coherently conceptualized condition exists
in the world in any meaningful way independent of the APA’s narrative
about the symptoms that might trigger the classification. This is similarly
true of any psychiatric diagnosis in that, while the symptoms may be
empirically observable, there is no empirically-based reason to describe a
list of symptoms as being one disorder or another disorder. 51 There is
therefore no scientific basis for bridging the gap between a set of clinical
symptoms and a diagnosis: the diagnosis is simply imposed on the
symptoms.52
50

See U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., Overview of Mental Illness, in MENTAL HEALTH: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL,
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2012). “The diagnosis of mental disorders is often believed to be more difficult than
diagnosis of somatic, or general medical, disorders, since there is no definitive lesion,
laboratory test, or abnormality in brain tissue that can identify the illness.” Id. “The
development of morbid anatomy and histology in the nineteenth century . . . showed that
many diseases defined as syndromes were in fact associated with identifiable lesions.
This led to the view that the demonstration of such an identifiable lesion was the defining
characteristic of disease . . . There are many problems with this clear-cut and initially
appealing view, especially perhaps as far as much of psychiatry is concerned.…however,
in psychiatry no physical basis has been defined for most of the major syndromes.” EVE
C. JOHNSTONE, ET. AL. SCHIZOPHRENIA, CONCEPTS AND CLINICAL MANAGEMENT, 3
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
51
Cf. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 46–47. See generally, Peter Zachar,
Psychiatric Disorders are not Natural Kinds, 7 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 167–82
(2000); Tim Thorton, Reliability and Validity, in Psychiatric Classification: Values and
neo-Humeanism, 9 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 229, 229–35 (2002).
52
“Categorical labels imply the presence of natural boundaries between major
syndromes, even though there is no empirical evidence for such boundaries. . . . Despite
the pervasive assumption that mental disorders are categorical, there is little or no
evidence that there are natural boundaries separating putative categories. . . . No one has
ever found a set of symptoms, signs, or tests that separate mental disorders fully into nonoverlapping categories. C. Robert Cloninger, A New Conceptual Paradigm from Genetics
and Psychobiology for the Science of Mental Health, 33 AUST. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY
174, 175–76 (1999). But see, Robert Kendell & Assen Jablensky, Distinguishing Between
the Validity and Utility of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 7 (2003)
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There is no logically necessary reason to believe that a patient with both
“odd beliefs” and “distorted perceptions,” but with perfect social manner,
presentation, and speech categorically suffers from the same mental illness
as a patient who presents with reduced speech output, a flattened affect, lack
of volition, and disorganized speech, but who also neither hallucinates nor
possesses any delusions.53 The only reason to hold such a belief is if one
already assumes the accuracy of the hypothesis that these are two
presentations of the same illness. When the principal evidence for an
organic basis for schizophrenia consists of the effects of drug therapies on
schizophrenic patients, as in the anti-psychotic drug example discussed
earlier, it does not help to show the diagnosis itself is an empirically valid
category and not an artificially assembled collection of symptoms. Just as a
single symptom can be symptomatic of multiple illnesses, a single drug may
prove effective treatment for multiple illnesses.54 This is even more relevant
in practice because prescription psychoactive drugs have mixed therapeutic
success,55 making the epistemological status of diagnostic categories as they
are applied in practice even more dubious than they are in theory.
Some MRI studies have shown certain brain-imaging scans to have a
correlation with schizophrenia. 56 However, in all of these studies, most
subjects with brain scans showing patterns positively correlating with
schizophrenia do not develop schizophrenia, and a portion of those subjects
with brain scans showing patterns negatively correlating with schizophrenia
go on to develop schizophrenia anyway.57 Because these MRI results are
(discussing the numerous commentators in the field who dispute the empirical validity of
psychiatric diagnostic categories).
53
To borrow from the DSM-IV-TR’s diagnostic criteria, see DSM-IV-TR, supra note
41, at 312.
54
Consider, for example, how many different conditions and diseases might be
ameliorated by aspirin or penicillin.
55
For example, with regard to anti-depressants, see Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 193–94.
56
See Shenton et al., supra note 48, at 1.
57
See id. For an excellent example of one study showing an unusually high degree of
correlation, see Dominic E. Job et al., Grey Matter Changes Can Improve the Prediction
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neither necessary nor sufficient for identifying schizophrenia,58 they in no
way validate the somatic existence of schizophrenia as a syndrome
described in the DSM. The MRI results may simply correlate, directly or
indirectly, to one of the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia without
correlating to the others, therefore providing little support for framing the
category of schizophrenia in the way psychiatrists have chosen to do so.59 If
a certain individual’s MRI results correlate strongly with flattened affect,60
the individual’s results would likely also correlate with schizophrenia
regardless of the actual predictive value of MRI results for schizophrenia’s
other symptoms. This is because anyone with flattened affect, already
meeting one criterion for schizophrenia, would have to meet fewer other
criteria than those without flattened affect. Given this, the MRI results
would merely delineate a population that partially meets one criterion for
schizophrenia, so even if individuals in that population were no more likely
than others to possess any of the other symptoms ascribed to schizophrenia,
they would still be more likely than average to fulfill the diagnostic criteria
as a whole.61
In this way, MRI studies provide only a false appearance of biological
grounding for schizophrenia.62 In reality, the use of MRI data does nothing
of Schizophrenia in Subjects at High Risk, BMC MEDICINE, Dec. 2006, at 29. Note,
however, that even in Job’s study, which took a population of “high risk” patients and a
low risk control group, most of those with an MRI pattern best predicting schizophrenia
never developed schizophrenia, and many of those without it did. See id.
58
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 41, at 299, 305. But see Dassori, Miller & Saldana, supra
note 8, at 304.
59
Cf. Thornton, supra note 51, at 229–35.
60
Flattened affect (also termed “blunted affect”) is a term for a lack of emotional
expression and expressive gestures. See GEORGE STEIN & GREG WILKINSON, SEMINARS
IN GENERAL ADULT PSYCHIATRY 174 (2d ed. 2007).
61
This group would need only one other Criterion A symptom whereas the rest of the
population would need two, so it would appear to be more likely to have “schizophrenia”
than the general population.
62
One of the most promising bits of MRI data was a finding that groups of
schizophrenics on average had less gray matter volume than control groups. See BengChoon Ho et al., Long-term Antipsychotic Treatment and Brain Volumes: A Longitudinal
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more than adding another inconclusive psychiatric symptom to the list
would. Unusual MRI scans are indicative of some biological state or
condition, but this is not in and of itself the syndrome described by the
DSM-IV-TR criteria for schizophrenia for the simple reason that no MRI
result includes or excludes the full population diagnosed as schizophrenic.63
Even if the available neuroscientific evidence is insufficient to validate
psychiatric classifications, presenting any sort of neuroscientific data or
claims (whether it is adequate evidence or not) as backing those
classifications will often convince people that they are valid.64
Even if all of the potential combinations of symptoms were to respond
favorably to the same treatments, plenty of medical illnesses with clearly
different and unrelated etiologies and presentations are treatable in the same
manner.65 While it is true that varied symptomatic presentation alone does
Study of First-Episode Schizophrenia, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 128 (2011).
More recent studies however have found that gray matter loss actually correlates with the
use of antipsychotic medication where the greater the amount of antipsychotics one takes,
the more gray matter one loses. See id. at 134.
63
See Job et al., supra note 57, at 29.
64
“Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to generate more public interest
when they contain neuroscientific information. Even irrelevant neuroscience information
in an explanation of a psychological phenomenon may interfere with people’s abilities to
critically consider the underlying logic of this explanation. We tested this hypothesis by
giving naïve adults, students in a neuroscience course, and neuroscience experts brief
descriptions of psychological phenomena followed by one of four types of explanation,
according to a 2 (good explanation vs. bad explanation) x 2 (without neuroscience vs.
with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience information was irrelevant to the
logic of the explanation, as confirmed by the expert subjects. Subjects in all three groups
judged good explanations as more satisfying than bad ones. But subjects in the two
nonexpert groups additionally judged that explanations with logically irrelevant
neuroscience information were more satisfying than explanations without. The
neuroscience information had a particularly striking effect on nonexperts’ judgments of
bad explanations, masking otherwise salient problems in these explanations.” Deena
Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 470 (2008).
65
For example, many different types of infectious agents present similar symptoms like
fever, and respond favorably to the same antibiotics. C.f. RICHARD A. HARVEY, PAMELA
C. CHAMPE, & BRUCE D. FISHER, LIPPINCOTT’S ILLUSTRATED REVIEWS:
MICROBIOLOGY ( 332-357) (describing numerous infectious agents and their symptoms
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not mean that a diagnosis is an artificially established category, in medical
diagnoses that can present with multiple symptoms, the illness is only
classified specifically and definitively if there is a physically observable
differential diagnostic criterion that can be applied regardless of the way the
symptoms present.66 Here again, the issue is whether the symptoms would
in fact provide evidence for the theory if the theoretical explanations for the
theory were not already assumed. A collection of symptoms can provide
evidence for the existence of a particular mental disorder only if the
diagnostic criteria are already presumed to correspond to features of some
real phenomenon. 67 To cite another example, while Ritalin improves the
study habits and exam scores of children with ADHD, it improves the study
habits and exam scores of most people who take it, to the point of
generating its own black market economy in schools. 68 Ritalin’s effects,
therefore, tell us very little about ADHD, just as looking at anti-psychotic
drugs tell us very little about schizophrenia. Thus, looking at symptoms or
effective treatments tells us very little about the root cause.
2. Is Psychiatry Different from Other Medical Fields in this Regard?
Many medical fields diagnose patients according to tests that lead
physicians to infer the existence of underlying tissue pathology without
observing it directly. 69 We have every reason to believe that our mental
experiences depend in part on the physical state of our brains, and we have
every reason to believe that atypical brain states can produce atypical

and treatments, some of which have similar symptoms and respond to the same
antibiotics).
66
See generally Stephen Walter, Gold Standard Test, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOSTATISTICS (2005).
67
See David L. Sacket et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What it Is and What it Isn’t, 312
BRIT. MED. J. 71, 71 (1996).
68
Jeremy Laurance, Ritalin Abuse Hits Students Looking for an Exam Kick, THE
INDEPENDENT (Aug. 26, 2003),
http://www.nootropics.com/methylphenidate/index.html.
69
See generally Walter, supra note 66.
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mental states. 70 It therefore seems very reasonable to assume that
profoundly abnormal mental experiences, such as daytime hallucinations,
are or may be caused by organic brain abnormalities.
A question arises: are psychiatric diagnoses un-testable, or simply
difficult to test? One of the most famous criticisms of the scientific status of
psychiatry is found in psychologist David Rosenhan’s “pseudo-patient”
experiment where he found that his assistants could gain admittance into
reputable hospitals and be diagnosed with schizophrenia simply by claiming
to have had auditory hallucinations; no amount of subsequent observation
was perceived as invalidating the original diagnosis 71 Rosenhan’s
conclusion, that this implied psychiatric diagnosis was fundamentally
unscientific, has been rightly criticized by retired professor of psychiatry
Robert Spitzer, 72 among others, for only demonstrating that diagnostic
reliability is difficult—and made more so when patients feign symptoms of
known disorders. 73 American neuroscientist Seymour Kety 74 pointed out
that if he was to drink a quart of blood and arrive at a hospital vomiting
blood, the staff would consistently diagnose him with a bleeding peptic
ulcer, but this misdiagnosis would not imply that medicine was incapable of
70

The effects of drugs and alcohol on the mind are reason enough to think this.
See D. L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCI. 250, 250 (1973).
72
Robert Spitzer, an extremely influential psychiatrist, is best known for leading the
development of the DSM-III as the chair of the American Psychiatric Association’s Task
Force on Nomenclature and Statistics. Spitzer also chaired the APA Work Group to
Revise the DSM-III, which produced the DSM-III-R and was a special advisor to the
APA Task Force on the DSM-IV. See DSM-IV-TR CASE BOOK VOL. 2. : EXPERTS TELL
HOW THEY TREATED THEIR PATIENTS xiii (Robert Spitzer et. al. eds., American
Psychiatric Publ’g, Inc. 2006).
73
See Robert L. Spitzer, More on Pseudoscience in Science and the Case for Psychiatric
Diagnosis: A Critique of D. L. Rosenhan’s “On Being Sane in Insane Places” and “The
Contextual Nature of the Psychiatric Diagnosis,” 33 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 459
(1976).
74
Seymour Kety was a very influential neuroscientist who developed the first method
for measuring cerebral blood flow, researched genetic predisposition for schizophrenia,
and served as the scientific director of the National Institute of Mental Health. See Phillip
S. Holzman, Seymour S. Kety, M.D., 1915–2000, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057, 1057
(2000).
71
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correctly diagnosing the condition. 75 This analogy would be an apt one,
except for the fact that it ignores the epistemologically relevant difference
between the type of claim being made when someone attributes vomiting to
an ulcer and when someone attributes hallucinations to schizophrenia.
The difference is that while a physician would not be able to assess
during an initial examination whether someone was vomiting blood because
the patient had an ulcer or because the patient drank a quart of blood, the
etiological theory that the patient had an ulcer is in principle confirmable
through visual inspection via endoscopy. However, no analogous possibility
exists with mental disorders. In non-speculative physical medicine,
although patient self-reports might lead to a diagnosis, the diagnoses are
based on an etiological theory derived from physical observation of the
biological mechanisms that could produce such symptoms.76 To return to an
earlier analogy, successfully applying “percussive maintenance” to a
television with a fuzzy picture might provide evidence that the TV suffered
from a problem in the vacuum tube’s power supply, but this is only because
people have opened up other malfunctioning televisions to examine their
wiring. There is no meaningful way to physically observe the cause of most
human behavior, including hallucinations and other bizarre mental
phenomena that seem necessarily organic in origin. Even neural imaging
fails to demonstrate causality because neuroanatomy and the degree of
blood flow to relevant parts of a brain are affected by external stimuli as
well.77 Behaviors can be both plausibly explained as caused by or causing
their neurological correlates.

75

See Seymour S. Kety, From Rationalization to Reason, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 957,
959 (1974).
76
See Sackett et al., supra note 67, at 72.
77
For example, talk therapy demonstrates distinct brain changes in patients suffering
from depression. See Kelly Connelly, Therapy Show a Distinct Pattern of Brain Changes
(Patients Recovering From Depression), MED. NEWS TODAY (Jan. 6, 2004),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/5181.php.
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We can also imagine instances where direct observation of the
relationship between a symptom and an underlying cause is in fact
available. If a patient suddenly has the subjective mental experience of
being unable to see, and CT scans of other patients with this subjective
mental experience have revealed tumors pressing against the optic nerve,
then the patient’s mental experience could provide empirically meaningful
evidence to suggest the possible presence of a brain tumor, even without a
CT scan. Of course, blindness would not provide irrefutable evidence of a
brain tumor, but it rather provides some evidence in proportion to the
likelihood of a brain tumor explaining the mental phenomenon. This
likelihood is itself scientifically determinable by analyzing the frequency
that brain tumors can be confirmed by CT scans in patients with such
mental experiences.
Where scientifically verifiable means of relating a symptom to an
underlying cause are available, however, the diagnosis is based not on the
methods of psychiatry but on the methods of clinical neurology. 78
Neurologists in these instances provide only epistemologically satisfying
evidence. Symptom interpretation here depends on the extent to which
doctors can directly observe tissue pathology in a patient’s brain and relate
those observations to behaviors and experiences. The psychiatric methods
of diagnosis add nothing in these instances and have no clear intersection
with neurology’s methods.79
3. Could Psychiatry Be Scientific in the Way Other Highly Theoretical
Fields Can Be Scientific?
Psychiatry is not the only field that both holds itself out as scientific and
advances claims about subjects that seem to have a physical basis but
78

See John Horgan, The Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Defies Replication,
Medication, and Explanation, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 470, 473 (1999). However,
“[n]euroscience has had virtually no payoff in terms of diagnosing and treating mental
illness.” Id.
79
Cf. id.
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cannot be observed directly. Theoretical physicists also study presumably
physical subjects beyond possible human observation. However, there is a
critical difference. When the subject of a physicist’s inquiry is an
unobservable phenomenon, a physicist will extrapolate the existence of an
unobservable phenomenon through the application of knowledge of the
laws of physics determined from direct observation. Thus, the underpinning
of a physicist’s theory of unobservable phenomenon remains grounded in
and derivable from what he or she can observe.
For example, while a black hole or an electron might be unobservable,
their existence is scientifically verifiable because the mechanisms by which
observable objects interact with each other form systematically discernible
“laws of physics,” which can be scientifically verified (or at least confirmed
to a high level of probability).80 These laws, when coupled with observable
data, can provide empirically meaningful support for hypotheses about the
unobservable phenomena they imply. If a physicist, observing a star
wobbling in a particular way, hypothesizes that this is due to the presence of
an unobserved massive celestial object in its vicinity, the hypothesis is
scientifically grounded to the extent that physicists have observed other
stars wobbling in the presence of observable massive celestial objects. 81
Even without directly “seeing” a black hole, a physicist can hypothesize its
presence scientifically by comparing the behavior of a star in the black
hole’s vicinity with the way other stars are affected by the gravity of large
observable celestial bodies. The unobservable phenomenon is thereby
inferred from observable, empirically accessible data.

80

See generally Jean Schneider, New Worlds Outside the Solar System, 10 EUR. REV.
185, 188-190 (2002) (describing the “stellar-wobble” technique of exosolar planet
detection, where stars are observed for a “wobble” characteristic of a planet’s
gravitational field effecting the star’s path. In this way, while the planet itself cannot be
directly viewed, the laws of gravity suggest that a star ‘wobbling’ in such a manner does
so because of another large but smaller mass, thus the existence of a planet is inferred
from the empirical data, but not observed directly.)
81
See id at 188-190.
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Starting from the presumption that subjective mental experience has a
physical basis in the brain, we have every reason to think that if a patient
suffers from hallucinations, he or she may have something physically
atypical about his or her brain. However, this is where psychiatric
methodology diverges from the methodology of theoretical physics. Not
only is any interaction between a particular abnormal behavior and the
purportedly physical mental illness unobservable, but psychiatric methods
offer no way to observe analogous interactions. In other words, there are no
fully observable systems in psychiatry to form an equivalent empirical basis
for their inferences.
C. Conclusion to Part One
It has been suggested that the need to place psychiatry within the realm of
medicine as a science is socially motivated: a way of raising the prestige of
mental health professions and reducing the stigma of their patients. 82
However, Part One of this article has shown that psychiatry and clinical
psychology cannot meet the standards of medicine, and thus awarding
psychiatry the social status of medicine is unjustified. In his paper, “On
Being Sane in Insane Places,” Rosenhan raised the issue of whether
observed patient symptoms produced consistent psychiatric diagnoses, or
whether, instead, once labeled with a diagnosis, all data from a patient could
be, and in fact was, interpreted as consistent with the diagnosis.83 When
Freud’s patients responded positively to his psychoanalytic interpretations,
he felt that the data confirmed his descriptions because they must have
corresponded with what was real in the patient. But when Freud’s patients
did not respond favorably, Freud attributed this to the strength and

82

See Sander L. Gilman, The Struggle of Psychiatry with Psychoanalysis: Who Won?, 13
CRITICAL INQUIRY 293, 295–96 (1987).
83
See Rosenhan, supra note 71, at 250.
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resistance of the neurosis he described, so these data also confirmed his
description.84
When the APA voted to remove homosexuality from its list of mental
disorders in the DSM-II, Rosenhan remarked that the fact a professional
organization could vote on whether or not a particular human experience
should be perceived as a “disorder” according to shifts in social perception
underscored the difference between psychiatric disorders and medical
ones. 85 Even now, the APA is planning to delete dozens of “mental
disorders” currently listed in the DSM-IV-TR from the new DSM-V
(expected in May 2013) while it simultaneously classifies new sets of
behaviors that people have long engaged in as criteria for mental
disorders.86 Some might protest that physicists also “vote” on the validity of
proposed laws of nature in that they collectively deem some theories
sufficiently supported and others not. The truth-value in physics, however,
does not ultimately depend on the opinions of physicists; some proofs work
mathematically and others do not. While Galileo’s heliocentric theory of the
solar system was rejected by the church-based intellectual establishment of
his day, he had reason to think he was nonetheless correct because his
theory was confirmable by observing the sky, rather than “confirmed” only
through the consensus of other physicists.
Psychotherapeutic theories, whether in the form of psychiatric diagnoses
or psychoanalytic descriptions, seem to be independent of and imposed on
data, rather than being dependent on and derived from data. Although these
psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practices could be extremely useful to
and improve the quality of life for some people, this usefulness does not
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provide the scientific status common to most modern medicine.87 To make
this distinction, psychoanalysis and psychiatry must be evaluated not only
in terms of the efficacy of their clinical practice, but also as academic
disciplines claiming to present evidence about the facts of the world. In this
regard, psychotherapeutic theories might be better conceptualized not as
scientific hypotheses, but as narrative descriptions88 While not scientifically
verifiable in the same manner as neurology or other medical disciplines,
psychotherapeutic theories may nonetheless be useful narratives, helpful in
developing a sympathetic understanding of individuals’ circumstances and
experiences. Even though psychotropic drugs tell us little about who has a
mental illness—and many are ineffective for treatment purposes—some
people still find them useful in dealing with the problems they face daily.
The ability to name the source of one’s problems can potentially feel
empowering or provide relief, even if there is no substance behind the name
apart from the institutional conventions of psychiatrists. Scientific
verification might then be unnecessary for the successful application of
psychiatry in a voluntary treatment setting. The same, however, may be
equally true of other unscientific treatments that some people nonetheless
find useful, like acupuncture. The fact that a treatment works does not mean
that it works for the reasons the practitioner says it works. Thus, successful
treatment does not necessarily justify regarding the practitioner as an expert
on the maladies he or she seeks to treat.

III. PART TWO: PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSES AS LEGAL EVIDENCE
The inherent epistemological liabilities of psychiatry have the potential to
cause profound problems in civil cases and the criminal justice system. In a
voluntary treatment setting, the epistemological questions are less important
since no one is in conflict. In an adversarial setting, where the question is
87

See Kendell & Jablensky, supra note 52, at 7.
Cf. Gardner, supra note 29, at 186–90 (arguing for an increasingly comprehensive
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88
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not simply what treatment could be effective but what version of the truth is
accurate, the epistemological questions matter profoundly because courts
must resolve a dispute between two parties, both advancing claims of fact to
support their desired outcomes. When providing evidence to establish the
legal elements for involuntary commitment, to use an insanity defense in
criminal trials, or to decide which patients are able to access potentially
helpful medication and which are restricted to non-medical treatments and
so on, description of the patient’s alleged mental illness will privilege one
party’s interests against another’s. Epistemological problems in psychiatry
may be unimportant to the voluntary patient who finds his or her treatment a
worthwhile experience, but these problems defeat the entire purpose of
permitting psychiatric expert testimony in a court of law when attempting to
determine the facts of a case.
In the following section, I argue that the unjustifiable reliance on
psychiatric expertise has the potential to produce substantively and
procedurally unjust results.
A. Psychiatric Testimony Does Not Contribute Meaningful Information
Psychiatrists are often called to testify as to whether or not an undesirable
behavior is caused by a mental illness. For example, in order to successfully
argue an insanity defense, one must generally demonstrate that a mental
illness affected the defendant’s reasoning about a crime and the defendant’s
ability to “distinguish between right and wrong.”89 If a person is mentally
ill, he or she is said to have diminished legal responsibility.90 Psychiatrists
have no means of observing the interaction between the supposed “cause,”
the mental illness, and the “effect” of the undesirable behavior. Instead, the
only data available for diagnosing mental illness is the undesirable behavior
itself. Rather than providing independent evidence of an illness, and
89

See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 134 (outlining the requisite conditions to be considered
as having a mental disease or defect).
90
See id.
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evidence for how and why it causes an undesirable behavior, the
psychiatrist does the opposite: he or she uses the undesirable behavior as
evidence for the mental illness.
In other words, while the psychiatrist has added his or her own
completely unverifiable hypothesis for why a person acts the way he or she
does, the psychiatrist has contributed absolutely no new evidence.
Psychiatrists do not even help a court understand the evidence before it
because, as described earlier, their methodology assumes the truth of
unverifiable relationships between the data and psychiatric hypotheses. To
describe a set of behaviors as symptoms of mental illness does nothing to
bridge the explanatory gap as to the cause of the behaviors. Instead, it
impresses the court with a sense of false necessity where judges and jurors
are likely to feel compelled to defer to “expert” opinions of psychiatrists,
often to a court’s detriment.91
A United States Supreme Court case from 1983, Barefoot v. Estelle,92
established that clinical opinions of psychiatrists could be employed to
answer hypothetical questions about a defendant’s potential dangerousness,
a practice employed extensively in Texas death penalty cases.93 In Texas,
juries in capital cases actually used to vote on whether a defendant would
receive the death penalty. 94 Psychiatrist James Grigson was frequently
permitted to testify during death penalty sentencing that there was a “one
hundred percent and absolute” 95 chance that the accused would commit

91
See Weisberg et al., supra note 64, at 470 (explaining how explanations that use
scientific jargon are often more persuasive to people, whether or not they are
scientifically sound).
92
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Morris v.
Woodford, 229 F.3d 775 (2000).
93
See Ron Rosenbaum, Travels With Dr. Death, VANITY FAIR, May 1990, at 141,
reprinted in SAMUEL BRAKEL & ALEXANDER BROOKS, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 252 (2001).
94
See id.
95
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919.
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violent acts in the future96 without even examining the defendant.97 At the
time, a person could only be sentenced to death in Texas if “there [wa]s a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society.”98 Grigson claimed that his
predictions constituted “medical opinion[s] . . . particular to the field of
psychiatr[y] and not to the average layman.”99 Justice Blackmun, remarking
on the poor “present state of psychiatric knowledge,” dissented in Barefoot
v. Estelle. Regarding Grigson, Blackmun wrote that “[i]n a capital case, the
specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an
impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical
specialist’s words, equates with death itself.” 100 While this example is
unusually dramatic, the “inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s
words”101 can prove decisive with judges and juries in more mundane civil
commitment cases. In another case where serious doubt still exists as to
defendant’s guilt, Grigon’s testimony may have contributed to the
controversial execution of Cameron Todd Willingham.102
In the landmark civil commitment case Addington v. Texas, 103 the
appellant argued that since due process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for criminal trials, due process must similarly require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt before the state can deprive someone of their liberty
through involuntary civil commitment.104 The US Supreme Court rejected
this argument and found that, unlike in criminal trials, involuntary civil
96

See Rosenbaum, supra note 93, at 252–53.
See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 923 n.6.
98
Id. at 884.
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Id. at 918.
100
Id. at 916.
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YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009,
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commitment proceedings could effectively incarcerate people under a mere
“clear and convincing” evidence standard. 105 The outcome is that those
merely alleged to be mentally ill are left with a second, lower due process
entitlement and lesser state-recognized liberty interests.106 This result was
only possible because of an unjustifiable deference to psychiatric expertise
and a gross overestimation of the reliability of psychiatric evaluations and
theories.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Addington Court, explained that:
Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either
himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert
psychiatrists and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the
fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to
whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an
individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.107
The Court concluded that the standard of proof should be lowered to
accommodate this “fallibility” and “lack of certainty.”108 A more reasonable
conclusion, however, would have been to recognize that psychiatrists and
psychologists are not in a privileged position to interpret the facts of a case,
and the spin they put on the facts should not be relied upon to tell a court
what the facts mean for legal purposes.
Federal Rule of Evidence (ER) 702 on expert witnesses superseded the
older “general acceptance” test for whether expert scientific testimony is
admissible.109 The rule states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
105

See id.
See id.
Id. at 429 (emphasis in the original).
108
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experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.110
By these criteria, a psychiatrist should not be able to qualify as an expert
witness on questions of either the “mental illness” or “danger to oneself or
others” criteria for civil commitment. Psychiatric explanations of mental
illness are not the product of reliable principles and methods, and
psychiatric evaluations of dangerousness are not particularly reliable.111 In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., the US Supreme Court held
that when faced with “expert scientific testimony . . . the trial judge,
pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment of whether
the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid
and properly can be applied to the facts at issue.” 112 While psychiatrists
might argue that they enjoy “general acceptance” in the scientific
community despite their methodological flaws, this should not permit them
to testify as experts under the Daubert standard, which explicitly rejects the
older “general acceptance” standard as a basis for evaluating expert
witnesses. 113 The Daubert Court further stated that “many considerations
will bear on the inquiry, including whether the theory or technique in
question can be (and has been) tested.”114 Because psychiatric theories of
mental illness cannot be meaningfully tested, a trial court in a jurisdiction

110

FED. R. EVID. 702.
A great deal of empirical research undermines the claim that psychiatrists are able to
predict dangerousness effectively. For reviews of this literature that conclude that
psychiatric dangerousness predictions are ineffective, see Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry
Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and
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following the Daubert standard should exclude psychiatrists as expert
witnesses under ER 702.
A possible objection to this line of argument may be that while
psychiatrists do not have scientifically testable theories, they at least have
extensive experience dealing with people who are “insane” or “mentally ill”
in the lay sense of these terms. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the US
Supreme Court found that Daubert’s judicial “gatekeeping” requirements
and standards apply not only to “scientific” testimony but to any expert
testimony (in the case, Carmichael sued Kumho Tire Company after a tire
blew out in an automobile, resulting in an accident that killed a passenger
and injured several others—a purported expert testified to defects in the
tire).115 In Kumho Tire Co., the Court upheld the exclusion of the testimony
of a “tire failure analyst” when a lower court found his methodology did not
satisfy the Daubert interpretation of ER 702, 116 even though the analyst
relied on “skill” and “experience” in his “observations.” 117 Given the
Kumho Tire Co. Court’s clarification of the Daubert standard, even if
psychiatrists can claim to have skill and experience in dealing with people
who are “crazy” in the lay sense of the word, that skill and experience
would not be sufficient by itself to make their testimony admissible if the
methodology they use cannot be shown to be reliable.
B. Civil Commitment
When people are deemed to be mentally ill, they may be legally deprived
of their liberty in circumstances where non-mentally ill persons cannot
be.118 Because the manner in which psychiatrists assign the status of mental
illness is unscientific and epistemologically suspect, regardless of any
legitimate governmental or social interests that might motivate civil
115
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commitment laws, such laws will be necessarily unreliable in their
application. There is then a profound danger of arbitrarily and unnecessarily
incarcerating people who have committed no crime. This danger is
amplified by the lack of due process afforded to people facing civil
commitment and the unjustifiable deference given to psychiatric testimony.
1. Why Civil Commitment?
Before critiquing civil commitment, it is necessary to consider three
possible reasons why allegedly mentally ill people are treated differently
from others with regard to involuntary confinement. One reason, provided
by Paul Applebaum, one of the leading defenders of civil commitment, is
that the only justification for confining mentally ill people in circumstances
where non-mentally ill people would not be confined is the potential for
treatment. 119 The entire purpose of commitment for Appelbaum, then, is
compulsory treatment.120
There are some immediate problems with this view. Were compulsory
treatment the necessary and sufficient reason for civil commitment, then the
only two elements for civil commitment that would make sense would be
the presence of a mental illness and a refusal to accept treatment (or perhaps
the presence of a severe mental illness, though it would be hard to imagine
what non-arbitrary criteria could be devised to determine this outside of
posing a danger to oneself or others). Instead, the overwhelming majority of
mental commitment statutes also require potentially committed persons to
be dangerous to themselves or others.121 The dangerousness criteria does
not reasonably relate to compulsory treatment, since many people are
mentally ill and refuse supposedly beneficial treatments, but are not
committable because they are not dangerous. If the public interest in civil
commitment is compulsory treatment, and not the protection of the public
119
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121
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or the “mentally ill” individual, then why should the state exempt people
who would equally “benefit” from compulsory treatment but who pose no
danger?
There is a constitutionally protected right, derived from an individual’s
liberty interests, to refuse medical treatment.122 The argument that mentally
ill people would benefit from needed medical treatment, and that this
benefit outweighs their right to refuse and therefore justifies commitment,
would apply equally to anyone who refuses needed medical treatment. Yet,
far from using the threat of commitment to coerce non-mentally ill people
into needed treatment, the state instead applies the coercive power of the
criminal and civil justice systems against doctors who attempt to override
patient refusal by regarding nonconsensual medical treatment of
“competent” patients as a battery.123
A second explanation for civil commitment is found in the inclusion of
the dangerousness criterion, which might imply that the state’s interest
actually lies in its police power to protect society from dangerous
individuals and protect individuals from themselves.124 However, if this is
the state’s legitimate motive, why should it limit civil commitment to those
who are both dangerous and mentally ill? Why not commit dangerous nonmentally-ill people as well? It is not the case that only mentally ill people
pose dangers to themselves. When non-mentally ill people refuse critical
medical treatment, they could certainly be seen as a danger to themselves,
and yet the refusal of medical treatment is a legally protected right.125 The
122
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state also allows people to participate in many high-risk recreational
activities such as cave diving, BASE jumping, or high-stakes gambling, and
actually facilitates students acquiring six-figure non-dischargeable debt in
an economy with uncertain job prospects. It would seem that, in general,
any state interest in protecting people from themselves is rarely compelling
enough to override personal liberty interests.126
The state interest in preventing grave disability implied by the “gravely
disabled” 127 criterion that is used in some states’ commitment statutes 128
does little to resolve this problem. For example, California law allows the
confinement of a person who, “as a result of a mental disorder, is a danger
to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.” 129 However, the
same law also expressly prohibits confinement of people who are gravely
disabled but not mentally ill. 130 This seems to imply that the state then
normally claims no sufficiently compelling interest in either preventing
someone from becoming gravely disabled or compelling someone to
recover from, treat, or ameliorate a grave disability. A gravely disabled
person whose disability is caused by anything but mental illness is free to
even after involuntary commitment and requires subsequent judicial procedures to
override. See id.
126
There are notable exceptions, like seatbelt and helmet laws, but these are neither
equivalent intrusions into personal liberty, nor are they enforced with incarceration or
civil commitment for those who would ignore them.
127
“Gravely disabled” is a term used in some states’ involuntary commitment statutes
that may refer to “individuals who are incapable of providing for their basic survival
needs,” or alternatively to individuals “unable to provide specific needs such as essential
medical care, shelter, or safety, leading to serious physical debilitation or serious physical
disease, or making the individual incapable of surviving safely in freedom.” 53 AM. JUR.
2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 19 (2011).
128
See Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to “Predict
Dangerousness”: A Commentary on Interpretations of the “Dangerousness” Literature,
18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 44–45 (1994).
129
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150 (West 2012). In California, the maximum term of
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47 days. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5270.55 (c).
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refuse a cochlear implant, artificial limb, or even a wheel chair; he or she
may, to borrow Appelbaum’s expression, “rot with their rights on.”131 Why
would the state have a greater interest in addressing the grave disability of
mentally ill people than addressing the grave disability of non-mentally ill
people? Surely the state’s interest in a person’s “ability” is in no way
enhanced just because that person is mentally ill.
A third possible justification is that mentally ill people are involuntarily
committed because they are irrational, and mental illness implies
irrationality.132 There are a number of problems with this justification. The
first is that while people often accuse each other of being “irrational,” there
is no generally agreed upon definition for rationality, nor is there any clear
way to evaluate whether or not someone meets that standard. 133 Some
would try to define rationality as “acting with self[-]interest,” 134 but this
fails to resolve the problem because “self-interest” is similarly controversial
and problematic to define.135 How does someone determine what is in their
self-interest, or in another’s self-interest? People frequently recognize that
each individual is best positioned to decide what is in his or her selfinterest, though in some cases people with the power to do so
paternalistically assert that socially less powerful people136 do not correctly
assess what is in their own best interests. This form of paternalism,
however, is not generally driven by any underlying, clarifying theory of
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rationality or best interest; it is simply the assertion of a value judgment.137
Value judgments of this type might be more or less persuasive, but they are
not uncontroversial, nor do they rest on logical necessity. More importantly,
there is no reason to think that psychiatrists are especially well-equipped to
make these value judgments, so deferring to psychiatrists on questions of
what is “irrational” and how much “irrationality” is sufficient for
commitment makes little sense.
The notion that mentally ill people can be confined because they are
irrational is also unpersuasive. Irrationality and dangerousness, without
mental illness, has not been regarded as sufficient for commitment (as
reflected by the fact that mental illness is a required element or component
of involuntary commitment statutes). For example, Christian Scientists and
Jehovah’s Witnesses are motivated by beliefs they agree are not grounded
in rationality, but instead dictated by faith. And yet, when these beliefs
cause them to refuse lifesaving treatment, 138 the state is generally not
permitted to intervene against their will.139 Several cases have found that
irrationality is no obstacle for legal competence to make one’s own medical
decisions, and a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment cannot be
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overridden simply because he or she is irrational.140 In Rodriguez v. Pino,
the Florida District Court of Appeals rejected two doctors’ arguments that
Pino’s inability to “make a rational decision” rendered her incompetent to
refuse medical treatment. 141 Instead, the court stated that “[o]bviously, a
patient may not be deemed incompetent simply because his decision is not a
medically appropriate one.”142 In Lane v. Candura, the Massachusetts Court
of Appeals reversed a lower court’s decision to appoint a temporary
guardian for a patient who refused a leg amputation, supposedly
irrationally. The Massachusetts Court of Appeals found that “the
irrationality of her decision does not justify a conclusion that Mrs. Candura
is incompetent in the legal sense. The law protects her right to make her
own decision.” 143 If a patient could be considered incompetent to refuse
medical treatment because doing so was not medically appropriate in a
physician’s view, this would obviously make the right to refuse treatment
meaningless.
These cases imply that the state recognizes that it does not have a
compelling interest in forced medical treatment, preventing dangerousness,
or in confining “irrational” people, but that it does in confining only people
who are both dangerous and mentally ill. 144 Because the state does not
confine people who are merely mentally ill and refusing treatment, it is not
consistent to claim that the compelling interest is found in the state’s parens
patriae interest to provide for citizens who cannot provide for themselves.
Instead, one might infer that mentally ill people are assumed to be uniquely
140
Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58 (Mass. 1999); Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225
(N.J. 1985) (offering support for this view in addition to the two cases previously
discussed).
141
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142
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143
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144
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(1979).
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dangerous, threatening, or uncontrollable, or that psychiatrists are best
equipped to predict dangerousness. Both assumptions are completely
unfounded, as discussed in the next section.
2. Mental Illness as an Element for Civil Commitment
Involuntary civil commitment is a state law issue, 145 and commitment
statutes vary from state to state. However, the overwhelming majority of
states require that in order to be involuntarily committed, a person must be
both dangerous to him or herself, or others, and mentally ill—a mere
finding of dangerousness is insufficient. 146 The reliance on “expert
psychiatrists and psychologists”147 described by the Addington Court cannot
be justified given the lack of scientific grounding in psychiatric theory. This
unreliability is grounded by the reality that psychiatrists are not competent
in reliably predicting future dangerousness, 148 and diagnoses of major
mental illnesses are not meaningfully associated with future violence.149
The MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law 150
conducted a study where 1,136 people admitted to acute civil inpatient
facilities in Worcester, Kansas City, and Pittsburgh were interviewed over a
period of twenty weeks from when they were discharged. 151 The study
found that a diagnosis of major mental disorders was actually associated
with a lower rate of violence than disorders not typically subject to
involuntary commitment, such as personality and adjustment disorders.152 A
diagnosis of schizophrenia was particularly associated with lower rates of
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violence, and there was no association with violence and delusions or
hallucinations.153 The study found that predictive risk factors were largely
demographic and that, unaided by actuarial data, psychiatrists are poor at
predicting future violence.154
The same group of researchers conducted an earlier study with five
hundred people in Pittsburgh.155 The study compared a patient population to
a general non-patient population where interviews with collaterals and
police record checks were made to determine the prevalence of violence
over a ten-week period. 156 The study found that “[t]he prevalence of
violence among people who have been discharged from a hospital and who
do not have symptoms of substance abuse is about the same as the
prevalence of violence among other people living in their communities who
do not have symptoms of substance abuse.”157 Of those who commit acts of
violence, the types of violence committed by people who had been released
from a mental institution and those who were in the community in the same
period of time were similar in terms of type, target, and location.158
Some judges have also expressed doubt that psychiatrists are able to
predict future dangerousness. The Blackmun dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle,
for example, cites numerous reports that question the ability of psychiatrists
153

See id.
See MACARTHUR RES. NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & L.
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/mentalhome.html (last updated May 2004).
155
See Henry J. Steadman, et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 393, 393 (1998). See also The MacArthur Commuinty Violence Study,
MACARTHUR RES. NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & L.,
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/violence.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (discussing
the Steadman, et al., study).
156
See Steadman, et al., supra note 155, at 393.
157
Id. Those patients who had substance abuse issues or were victims of crimes were
more violent than substance abusers and victims of crimes who did not also have major
mental illnesses. See id. The point remains, though, that major mental illness alone was
not an indication of dangerousness, but it could be when combined with one of these
three other factors.
158
See id.
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to predict dangerousness.159 The APA’s amicus brief in Estelle stated that
“[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future
dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession.”160 The
Estelle dissent also cites the APA’s “Draft Report of the Task Force on the
Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process” as claiming that
“[c]onsiderable evidence has been accumulated by now to demonstrate that
long-term prediction by psychiatrists of future violence is an extremely
inaccurate process.”161 Another commentator said that “[i]n general, mental
health professionals . . . are more likely to be wrong than right when they
predict legally relevant behavior. When predicting violence, dangerousness,
and suicide, they are far more likely to be wrong than right.”162 Although
Estelle dealt with death penalty sentencing testimony, the unreliability of
psychiatric opinions on future dangerousness should equally call into
question psychiatric testimony in civil commitment cases, where future
dangerousness is also typically among the criteria the state must prove.
3. Deprived of Liberty without Due Process of Law163
Before a criminal court can deprive an accused person of his or her
liberty, the state must have demonstrated proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 164 The US Supreme Court ruled in Addington v. Texas that due
process for civil commitment does not require the same “proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard”—rather, it merely requires a “clear and
convincing standard” of proof.165 The Addington Court’s reasoned that:
[T]he state [should not] be required to employ a standard of proof
that may completely undercut its efforts to further the legitimate
159

See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920–22 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 920.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
164
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 421–422 (1979).
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Id. at 425.
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interests of both the state and the patient that are served by civil
commitments.”166 …
We have concluded that the reasonable-doubt standard is
inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the
uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the
state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to
needed medical treatment.167
This reasoning is extremely flawed for numerous reasons. The fact that
the “uncertainties of psychiatric diagnoses” are such that they cannot meet
the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal cases
is not a reason to arbitrarily lower the level of proof constitutionally
required for due process. Instead, if psychiatric diagnoses cannot meet the
burden of proof required by criminal due process to deprive someone of
their liberty, psychiatric diagnoses should not be relied on when basic
liberty is at stake.
A significant reason why a “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is
applied to criminal cases is because the public has a justifiable suspicion of
the veracity of the state’s case. The mere fact that a police officer or a
district attorney says that a person is a criminal who has committed a felony
is grossly insufficient to persuade a court that the accused should be sent to
prison. Instead, the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt
because the state’s position alone is insufficient to justify a conviction.
Psychiatric theories of mental illness lack a reliable basis in evidence. The
fact that the state’s psychiatric witnesses receive greater deference than the
state’s law enforcement officers or attorneys is entirely unjustifiable: at
least a prosecutor is required to have some sort of material evidence,
whether physical evidence or eyewitness testimony, to bring charges rather
than relying on mere suspicion or opinion. A psychiatrist, however, is able
to present no material evidence whatsoever.
166
167

Id at 430 (emphasis added).
Id at 432 (emphasis added).
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The argument that “[t]he state [should not] be required to employ a
standard of proof that may completely undercut its efforts to further the
legitimate interests of both the state and the patient that are served by civil
commitments”168 entirely misses the purpose of constitutionally protected
due process. Due process does not protect the “legitimate interests of the
state,” but the liberty interests of the accused. Many crimes are extremely
difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. For many of these difficult-to
prove-crimes, the state has an arguably greater interest in criminal
prosecution than any typical state interest in civil commitment. 169 The
difficulty posed in the prosecution of these crimes does not justify lower
due processes standards, and with good reason: the state has no legitimate
interests in convicting people who are not proven guilty, and the standard of
proof used to determine guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt.
A legal finding of guilt is a status that can only be assessed in relation to
a standard of proof—a person is guilty for legal purposes because he or she
has been proven guilty according to a legal process that satisfies the state’s
burden of proof. If the state arbitrarily lowered the standard of proof in
criminal cases so that only clear and convincing evidence was sufficient to
find guilt, then the state would be equally able to claim an interest in
punishing that new and enlarged set of “guilty” people. When the state has
demonstrated guilt to a clear and convincing standard, but not beyond a
reasonable doubt, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard undercuts the
state’s interest in punishing people whose guilt is demonstrated clearly and
convincingly. But the state has no legitimate interest in treating those
people as guilty because the standard is not clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, but evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
168

Id. at 430.
Perhaps the most widely discussed example is the difficulty of proving rape to such a
standard where no physical evidence exists, coupled with the vital social importance of
prosecuting rapists. For discussion, see generally Shelia Weller, Why is Date Rape so
Hard to Prove? 6 (4) HEALTH (TIME INC. HEALTH) 62 (Jul. 1992) (discussing these
issues).
169
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The same reasoning applies with regard to civil commitment. The state
can only claim a legitimate interest in committing people who are mentally
ill and dangerous to a clear and convincing (but not beyond a reasonable
doubt) standard if it is presupposed that the legal threshold for mental
illness and dangerousness is clear and convincing evidence and not the
beyond reasonable doubt standard. The Addington Court’s logic, then, is
entirely circular. It implicitly posits a legally relevant standard of proof for
mental illness and dangerousness of less than beyond a reasonable doubt
standard as a justification for insisting that the standard is too burdensome.
Reasoning similar to the Addington Court’s logic is offered in Tippett v.
Maryland:
It must be recognized, however, that as to the ultimate issue of the
inmate’s dangerousness, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
may in practical operation be too onerous. After all, the ultimate
issue is not as in a criminal case whether an alleged act was
committed or event occurred, but the much more subjective issue
of the individual’s mental and emotional character. Such a
subjective judgment cannot ordinarily attain the same “state of
certitude” demanded in criminal cases.170
It is, of course, often true that a finding of dangerousness cannot “attain
the same ‘state of certitude’” as “demanded in criminal cases.”171 But this
again fails to provide a credible justification for lowering the standard,
making it is easier to lock people up whose dangerousness is less certain.
Whether the deprivation of liberty is to be justified by the fact of an action
that actually occurred, or a Minority Report-style 172 future prediction of
170

Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1165 (4th Cir.1971).
See id. at 1165.
172
See generally PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT (2002). “The Minority
Report,” a famous science fiction short story by Philip K. Dick, involves individuals in
law enforcement with the ability to predict future crimes and imprison people
accordingly. This story was supposed to be dystopian, but it is essentially the same theory
that civil commitment operates under. However, “precrime” predictions in “The Minority
Report” were said to be highly accurate, whereas our courts acknowledge the fallibility of
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dangerousness, the loss of liberty is the same. It is completely unreasonable
to argue that the standard of proof for confining someone for the possibility
that they might commit a crime should be lower than the standard of proof
required for confining someone for actually having committed a crime. In
the former instance, the harm to society posed by the accused is purely
theoretical; in the latter case, it is actual. The standard of proof used in a
trial “serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants,”173 and where
the interest of the individual greatly outweighs the interest of the state, the
standard of proof should allocate the risk overwhelmingly to the state.174
Whether in a criminal trial or civil commitment proceeding, individuals
stand to be deprived of the same liberty interest, and since it is unreasonable
to think that the state has a greater interest in preventing theoretical harm
than in deterring actual harm, it follows that the risk of error should be
distributed even more extensively onto the state in civil commitment
hearings than in criminal trials.
It is possible that the interest in punishing people for crimes they have
already committed is different and less than the state’s interest in preventing
future harm.175 To punish someone for a crime that is already in the past
may do little to remedy the damage, whereas detaining someone so that they
cannot commit an act of violence might actually prevent a crime from
taking place. 176 To tease out the different interests at work in these two

psychiatric diagnoses, but nonetheless allow psychiatrists to exercise similar power. For
example, see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 432 (1979) as earlier discussed.
173
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
174
Id. at 427 (“The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk
of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any
possible harm to the state. We conclude that the individual’s interest in the outcome of a
civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the
state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the
evidence.”).
175
This point was brought to my attention by Heathcote Wales in comments on an early
draft of this paper.
176
Id.
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scenarios, consider three principle justifications for criminal punishment.177
First, punishing criminals might serve to deter others from committing the
same crime in the future, thus preventing future harm.178 Second, physically
imprisoning people incapacitates them from harming society while
imprisoned. 179 Third, punishment fulfills a retributive role of justice that
sets moral standards of acceptable behavior for society by meting out “just
deserts.”180
The police power aspect of civil commitment is, for the most part,
justified by only the second state interest: it protects society through
incapacitating the committed person. Most criminal prison sentences are
justified on all three grounds because they deter, incapacitate, and exact
retribution. If civil commitment is justified only in terms of incapacitation,
but criminal punishment is justified by incapacitation, deterrence, and
retribution, then the state would seem to have greater interests in punishing
criminals than involuntarily committing patients.
There are cases, however, where criminal punishment cannot be justified
by deterrence or incapacitation. For example, consider a single individual
convicted of voluntary manslaughter committed “in the heat of passion”
under circumstances extremely unlikely to be repeated. If the crime of
voluntary manslaughter due to a “reasonable” emotional rage always went
unpunished, then there would be less to deter people from committing the
crime in the future. However, a robust deterrent effect could be sustained
even if a small number of individuals went unprosecuted (perhaps the ones
177

Of course, there are many other justifications for punishment, and this is a necessarily
simplified presentation. See Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
178
See e.g., Kevin Carlsmith, John Darley & Paul Robinson, Why Do We Punish?
Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 284, 284–99 (2002); JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME:
PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 229 (2003).
179
See Legal Punishment, supra note 177.
180
For discussion, see John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, NOT JUST DESERTS: A
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (Oxford: Claredon Press 1990).
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least likely to recommit). Moreover, the effect of deterrence on true crimes
of passion is debatable. Such crimes are surely less likely to be deterred by
punishment than premeditated and rationally self-interested crimes.
Incapacitation would also be an insufficient reason to lock people up in
this situation since they would pose no danger to others, and because the
circumstances in which they killed would not likely arise again. The only
justification left for punishing these crimes of passion at all would be
retribution and social condemnation. These interests may very well be less
compelling than the state’s interest in preventing future violence, a
supposed purpose for civil commitment. However, the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard is not reserved only for crimes in which the state
has a singular, potentially lesser, interest. The proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is instead applied to all crimes, including those where
deterrence and incapacitation are the most prominent interests served
through punishment. When considering the rationale for different standards
of proof between criminal punishment and civil commitment, it is necessary
to consider the public interests implicated by the entire range of crimes that
require a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, rather than only the
crimes where the state may plausibly have diminished interests in
prosecution.
The Addington Court again applies circular reasoning by beginning from
the implicit premise that an individual subject to civil commitment
proceedings is, in fact, mentally ill:
The heavy standard applied in criminal cases manifests our
concern that the risk of error to the individual must be minimized
even at the risk that some who are guilty might go free. The full
force of that idea does not apply to a civil commitment. It may be
true that an erroneous commitment is sometimes as undesirable as
an erroneous conviction. . . . Moreover, it is not true that the
release of a genuinely mentally ill person is no worse for the
individual than the failure to convict the guilty. One who is
suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of
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treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma. It cannot
be said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to
“go free” than for a mentally normal person to be committed.181
By arguing that a mentally ill person is not “wholly at liberty” and
implying that it is, therefore, worse “for the individual” to allow a
“genuinely mentally ill person” to “go free” than it would be to allow a
guilty person to go free, 182 the Addington Court presupposes that the
individual in question is, in fact, “genuinely mentally ill.” Obviously,
releasing a person who is not actually mentally ill has the same
consequences as releasing a person who is not actually guilty: namely,
preserving their freedom rather than wrongfully depriving them of it. The
Addington Court itself recognizes this issue, stating “[t]his Court repeatedly
has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”183
The Addington Court’s claim that mentally ill people are not totally free
from stigma when not confined 184 has identical problems. Accepting the
highly questionable claim that the “mentally ill” are not “free from stigma”
whether they are committed or not, courts cannot simply presume that
anyone alleged to be mentally ill is in fact mentally ill. Civil commitment
also has obviously stigmatizing effects. 185 The Addington decision states
that:
[I]t is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others
can engender adverse social consequences to the individual.
Whether we label this phenomena “stigma,” or choose to call it
something else, is less important than that we recognize that it can

181

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1979) (internal citations omitted).
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Id. at 425.
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See id. at 429.
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See Bruce Link & Jo Phelan, Labeling and Stigma, in A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY
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occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the
individual.186
There is no meaningful way to compare the consequences of false
negatives across categories for policy purposes without knowing the ratio of
false negatives to true negatives. This problem reaches the point of
absurdity when it is recognized that the category of legal guilt exists only as
a product of judicial process—one is legally innocent until proven legally
guilty by a court of law. While the acts that evidence guilt in a crime have a
separate ontological existence from a finding of guilt, there is no test for
guilt independent of the judicial system that would produce the potential
false negatives and false positives. 187 Similarly, while the behaviors and
ideas taken to be “symptoms” of mental illness may have an ontological
existence on their own, mental illness itself exists only insofar as
psychiatrists label a set of attributes or persons as mentally ill. The
comparison between the consequences of a mentally ill person being
released to the consequences of a guilty person being released is entirely
inappropriate and meaningless for policy purposes.
The conclusion is also extremely strange because it implies that,
consequences to the individual aside, it is worse for a mentally ill person to
go free than a guilty person to go free. For example, it is hard to imagine
any persuasive policy or legal argument that a murderer or mafia boss is
better off on the streets than a potentially suicidal person.
Another line of argument adopted in numerous decisions is that a civilly
committed person need not be afforded the same protections as a suspect in
a criminal case because the intent is not punitive.188 The Court in Addington
writes, “there are significant reasons why different standards of proof are
called for in civil commitment proceedings as opposed to criminal
186

Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26.
Of course, while someone found innocent cannot later be found guilty for the same
crime, one found guilty may later be legally exonerated—so this is a case where false
negatives are a null set, but false positives are not.
188
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prosecutions. In a civil commitment state power is not exercised in a
punitive sense.”189 The Court cites State v. Turner190 for the proposition that
“the State of Texas confines only for the purpose of providing care designed
to treat the individual.”191 This reasoning was described more elaborately in
Schall v. Martin, where the Court held that juveniles detained pending trial
were not being punished, because the purpose of the detention was not
expressly punitive, but to prevent them from committing crimes for which
they otherwise may not have been detained. 192 The parallels with civil
commitment for the mentally ill should be obvious: detention is supposedly
justified not to punish someone for an action they have committed, but to
prevent them from carrying out some act of violence.
In the more recently decided Gilford v. People, the Colorado Supreme
Court argued that “since commitment proceedings are not designed to
address criminal conduct, but rather are concerned only with the present and
future mental health and well-being of the mentally ill individual, it
necessarily follows that ‘no penal or punitive considerations underlie the
state’s interest in . . . commitment.’”193 This reasoning misses the crux of
the issue: while the state has no interest in punishing people for being
mentally ill, a person has an interest in not being punished.
A defender of the Addington decision might contend that not only is the
state’s intent non-punitive,194 but that a civilly committed person, though
confined and deprived of liberty, does not in fact experience punishment in
the same way as a convict because civil commitment is not similarly
189

Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 666 (Tex. 1977). Turner challenged a judgment
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563.
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stigmatizing. Criminal convictions stigmatize by design because they serve
to blame and denounce the convict for behavior that society deems
intolerable—civil commitment, however, carries no such blame. Thus, the
Addington Court might seem justified in thinking that the lack of punitive
intent on the part of the state would be relevant—without punitive intent,
there is perhaps less stigma. In this way, there might be less interest in
avoiding civil commitment because commitment would not bring the social
condemnation of a criminal conviction.
This logic relies on a false understanding of the practical social
consequences that result from being labeled mentally ill and confined to a
mental institution as a danger to oneself or others. Labeling theory and,
more relevantly, “modified” labeling theory, as developed in the 1980s by
Bruce Link and Jo Phelan of Columbia University’s School of Public
Health, explain how stigma and subtle discrimination resulting from a
mental illness label could have a tremendously negative impact on a
person’s life.195
Early in life, people in society develop a “lay theory about what it means
to have a mental illness,”196 which shapes their expectations about whether
people will reject others with “mental illness.”197 Because people who are
labeled as having “mental illness” are also socialized in this manner, they
may “act less confidently and more defensively, or they may simply avoid a
potentially threatening contact altogether.” 198 This may result in
uncomfortable social interactions, reduced self-esteem, and a diminished
quality of life.199 Link and his colleagues found that people labeled with
“mental illness” who recognize that others devalue and discriminate against
195

See Labeling and Stigma, supra note 185, at 573.
Bruce Link & Jo Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, in DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A TEXTREADER IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 264, 274 (Delos H. Kelly & Edward Clarke
eds., 7th ed. 2008).
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the mentally ill respond to this recognition with secrecy, withdrawal, and
attempts to educate about mental illness. 200 Those who withdraw end up
having a limited social network composed primarily of household
members. 201 Amy Kroska and Sarah Harkness tested a hypothesis that a
cultural perception of mental illness as devalued and discriminated against
negatively affects labeled persons, but not unlabeled ones, by comparing
community residents to psychiatric patients according to their perceptions
of “mentally ill persons,” “myself as I really am,” and “myself as others see
me.” 202 The stigmatizing associations between ratings for perceptions of
“mentally ill persons,” “myself as I really am,” and “myself as others see
me” was stronger in the labeled group than in the unlabeled group.203
Additionally, the potential benefits of treatment do not prevent or reverse
the negative effects of stigma. In a longitudinal study, Link found that
reported experiences of discrimination continued to negatively impact
former patients’ lives long after they were “far less symptomatic and largely
drug and alcohol free.”204 A follow up study in 1997 by Link found that
while “symptoms” improved after treatment, the effects of stigma on selfesteem endured.205
It is also generally questionable whether a criminal conviction carries
more stigma than involuntary commitment for mental illness and
dangerousness. Some crimes, especially violent crimes and sex crimes, are
highly stigmatizing. Many non-violent crimes (such as marijuana
possession, certain white collar offenses, etc.) seem to have minimal stigma
attached in many communities. Prison sentences are generally seen as

200
See Bruce Link et al., A Modified Labeling Theory Approach to Mental Disorders: An
Empirical Assessment, 54 AMERICAN SOC. REV. 400, 403 (1989).
201
See id.
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Labeling Theory of Mental Illness, 71 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 193, 193 (2008).
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See Labeling and Stigma, supra note 185, at 361, 371.
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See id.
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highly stigmatizing,206 but they may be less so in communities that have a
large population that have been in prison.207 More robust due process rights
are afforded to defendants in many cases that do not even attach to a prison
term. By comparison, mental illness might be a stigma of rather mythic
proportions: it is common to declare the most despicable public enemies as
“insane.” For example, Hitler is popularly described as “insane,”208 as are
Kim Jong Il,209 Saddam Hussein210, and comic book super villains.211
When considering a jurisprudentially consistent due process standard for
depriving someone of liberty, the relevant interests to consider are not the
state’s interests, but the interests of the person whose liberty hangs in the
balance. To an individual who expresses no interest in mental health
treatment but a profound interest in his or her freedom, the state’s purpose
is essentially irrelevant. This logic was applied in Specht v. Patterson,
where the court held that “the punishment under the second Act is criminal

206
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punishment even though it is designed not so much as retribution as it is to
keep individuals from inflicting future harm.”212
The assertion that the state’s supposed interest ought to be the deciding
factor in how much due process someone is afforded invites the possibility
that the state could reduce its burden and imprison more people simply by
relabeling socially undesirable groups subject to civil, rather than criminal,
sanctions. This possibility was hinted at in Powell v. Texas, a case in which
a person convicted of public drunkenness attempted to rely on the excuse
that he was “mentally ill” with “alcoholism.”213 The Powell Court stated:
[T]he medical profession cannot, and does not, tell us with any
assurance that, even if the buildings, equipment and trained
personnel were made available, it could provide anything more
than slightly higher-class jails for our indigent habitual inebriates.
Thus we run the grave risk that nothing will be accomplished
beyond the hanging of a new sign—reading “hospital”—over one
wing of the jailhouse. One virtue of the criminal process is, at
least, that the duration of penal incarceration typically has some
outside statutory limit; this is universally true in the case of petty
offenses, such as public drunkenness, where jail terms are quite
short on the whole. “Therapeutic civil commitment” lacks this
feature; one is typically committed until one is “cured.” Thus, to
do otherwise than affirm might subject indigent alcoholics to the
risk that they may be locked up for an indefinite period of time
under the same conditions as before, with no more hope than
before of receiving effective treatment and no prospect of periodic
“freedom.”214
Far from reducing the need for due process protections, supposedly nonpunitive civil commitment can result in a longer and more severe loss of
freedom. As the Powell Court described, renaming a jailhouse wing to
“hospital” hardly alleviates the harms of confinement.215 It is also certainly
212
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not clear that confinement in a mental institution is a lesser loss of liberty
than confinement in a prison. Involuntary commitment in a mental
institution, like a prison, locks people away against their will, depriving
them of their freedom of movement and ability to participate in society at
large. While most patients in the majority of mental hospitals may have
better conditions than those in super-max prisons, defendants serving time
in comparatively comfortable minimum security prisons and federal prison
camps still enjoy a right to be tried by a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. Patients may be subjected to pressure and leveraging to compel
them to take psychotropic medication against their will; they can be
mechanically restrained and injected with mind-altering drugs; many are put
in conditions essentially comparable to solitary confinement (euphemized
as “seclusion”). 216 In these ways, it is easy to imagine that involuntary
commitment can sometimes represent a more extreme and total loss of
liberty than many prison terms.

IV. CONCLUSION
Having explained why psychiatry is not, and cannot be, a legitimate
science capable of informing the meaning of facts to a court and how the
specter of mental illness is used as an unjustifiable means of circumventing
due process, I conclude with some brief but substantial recommendations
for mental health law reform.
First, psychiatric diagnoses should not form part of the criteria for
determining who is civilly committable. As described in Part One, theories
of mental illness are unverifiable and the concept of specific and discrete
diagnoses is incoherent. As described in Part Two, the presence of a
diagnosis of major mental illness, or of hallucinations or delusions, is not by
itself predictive of future violence. Psychiatrists are extremely poor at
216

See generally Laura Stokowski, Alternatives to Restraint and Seclusion in Mental
Health Settings: Questions and Answers from Psychiatric Nurse Experts, MEDSCAPE
TODAY, May 3, 2007, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/555686.
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predicting “dangerousness,” rendering them useless for the purposes relied
on for civil commitment. Retaining psychiatrically described “mental
illness” as a criterion for involuntary commitment arbitrarily privileges the
collective and individual guesses of a profession that is incapable of
fulfilling the trust courts place in it.
Second, while the state has a legitimate interest in preventing highly
probable acts of violence, lowering the burden of proof in order to “prove”
dangerousness is inconsistent with the notions of justice and fairness on
which liberal democratic legal systems are based. Because the liberty
interest implicated in civil commitment is the same as in criminal
incarceration, for the state to legitimately confine someone on a theory of
future dangerousness, due process should be understood to demand the
same level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that is normally required to
confine someone for extended lengths of time. Since, as the Addington
Court argued, this higher burden of proof is unlikely to be met on a question
of future harm rather than on a question of actual harm, commitment for
dangerousness should also be abolished or used very sparingly when there
truly is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People who prove themselves
dangerous by way of a conviction for an actual crime should instead be able
to voluntarily seek psychiatric treatment within the criminal justice system
(possibly in hospital facilities segregated from other prisoners). Such a
scheme would retain any possible benefits of civil commitment, including
the availability of treatments that may be helpful even if the diagnoses
associated with it are not scientifically valid. It would do so, however,
without violating people’s civil rights through preventative detention with
dubious rationale and insufficient due process.
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